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Born in )84 B.C., in Stagira, a town in P'acedonia, Aristotle was the
son of a we 11-known physic ian.
with Philip of ¥aced onia.

As he grew, Ar ist ot le c a.ne to be ac qua. inted

When he was eighteen, he can:e to Athens and

entered Plato's Academy, where he remained until Plato 1 a death in )47 B.C.
AriS.t otle moved to Aesos, in the ·r road, Asia Minor, and remained in the
court of Hertreias until he was invited to return to llacedon as tutor of
the thirteen year old Prince Alexander, son of his boyhood friend, Philip.
The young Alexander later beoane conquer or of the known war ld, during
w-h ich tine, Aristotle returned to Athena to found his own school.

He

founded his school in a suburb of Athens, the Lyceulli, and taught there
for the next eleven years.

The school received the nan:e peripatetic

because of Aristotle's habit of walking as he taught.

In the afternoons,

he addressed larger crowds and was,therefore, seated. It was during this
period that the Nicornachean Ethics were formulated.

When Alexander

died in 32;;, anti-Yacedonian feeling swept over Greece·.

Recalling the

fate of Socrates, Aristotle retired to his country estate and died a
year later.
We have a problem concerning the writings of Aristotle, namely, we
cannot be sure whether or not Aristotle really wrote them in the form
that we have them today.

There are diacrepanc ies in his works as we

have them today, and three principal explanations have been rnades (1)
the works were not writ ten by Aristotle but were compiled by the students
from their notes (2) they represent Aristotles lecture notes, and (5)
the original writings were lost, recovered in dawa.ged form, and were
pieced together by incompetent editors. 1

One point that would tend to

support the first two explanations ia tbat in the Ethics, references are
made to an audience.
lAristotle, Philip Wheelwright, Aristotle, (New York:
Press, Inc., 19?5). -p. xviii.

The Odyaaey
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Prior to Heraclitus, the Greeks felt that all character ist ice were
divided into two opposite poles and were, therefore, in pairs.

Heraclitus

taught that . a continuum existed from one extrerre to the other, and these
teachings had an effect upon Aristotle as we shall see later.

When con-

sidering hot and cold as an example, according to Heraclitus, there
.was also a middle or transitional temperature with degrees of hot or
cold proceeding in their respective direciions.
opposites intermingle.

Plato also admitted that

Ari.atotle differed from his teacher when it canE

to the question of Platenic Forina, or learning as nErely a renx;mbrance
or archtypes .2
As far as the naming of the NiQ·orua.c hean Ethics ia ccmcerned, there
are two main theories--one holds "that the Ethics is dedicated to Nicomachus, Aristotle's son, and the other clain1s that Nioomachus was the
editor of the Ethics .5
By definition, ethics is a study of values, what is right and good. 4
While ethics is the study, morality is the practical application of the
results of the study.

Ethics are theoretical, while morality is pragmatic.

Politics and sociology deal with facts, and scientists are concerned
.... ~.

with these.

Philosophy deale with a critical analysis and ev e luation

of these facts.
Concerning politics, the Ethics ia one-half of a a ingle treatise
including PQ1itica 1 which Aristotle calls the "philosophy. of human
affairs".

In fact, Aristotle's ruain purpoae in writing the Etbice

~~-I!L.- ~Q_fit

'! . ~ to be a good o it izeri 'of the state.

Thi e pragmatic

2rbid, p • .xxx.
-'William S. Sahakia.n, Systems of Ethics and Value Theory, (Patter-s on,
New Jerseya Littlefield, Adams, and Co., 1964), p. 1.

4 Ibid., p. 2.

outlook stems f'rom Aristotle's rejection of the
Plato's teachinga.5

11

other worldliness" of

Another source puts it this way-- 11 • • • in the

Ethics and Politics, Aristotle is concerned with the good for man qua
member of the city-etate. 11 6 He goes on to say that. the Ethics is concerned·
with training statesmen, thereby creating the beet life for all people.
With these things in mind, let us begin our study of the Nicomachean
Ethics •
The opening statement of the Ethics holds that all things must aim
at some good.

This good must be self-auffic ient and final and must be

looked at in the li ght of a complete life.

Since all things aim at good,

this good must be the fulfillment of nature.
point of Aristotle's philosophy, namely that
in va in."

This brings us to a focal
11

• nature does nothing

One source holds with this interpretation-- 11 Man 1 s essential

fun-ction is the actualization of his potentialities. 11 7

Aristotle recog-

n b ea that man is the only animal that can pervert nature, and along with
this perver.a ion comes frustration and unhappiness.

He feels so strongly

about this that he holds that evil is this perversion of nature.
ingly,

11

•••

Accord -

the function of man is activity of soul .' which follows or

implies a rational principle. 11 8
Man is a rationa l creature, and his uniqueness lies in his poueseion
of an intellect .

From what we ha ve seen thus far, man lives a good 1 ife

by living according to what he rationally perceives as being in tune
with nature or the rational pr inc iptl e.

The first res pons ibil ity,

there ~ o~

5Arist-atle, D•.P. Chase, and J .A. Smith, The Ethics of Aristotle,
(New Yorka E.P. Dutt.o n and Oo., Inc., 1950) p. xtii.
6Aristotle, B.H. Joachim, D.A. Reea, The Nicomachean Ethics, (Oxford:
OlarendonPresa, 1951), p. 17.
7Sahakian, op. cit., p. ).
8Ar istotle, Nicomache a n Ethics.
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is to know what you are, and how much so you are, and then be it .9·~·
Thill i mplies that each man has differe-ht potentialities and qualities.
To live well, a man should (1) develop physically(~) cultivate his emotional and psychological life and (5) unfold his inte llectua.l self' _10
This life ia referred to as one possessing self-realization.
To continu.e concerning good, Aristotle holds that there must be an
u~timate

good which is, as we said before, self'-sufficent, and must be

looked at in the light of a coroplete life.
good cannot come from chance.

He says that this ult irnate .,.

He holds that this good is happiness.

Although it is the ult irna.te good, it can depe nd upon external good or
proaperity to some extent, because the absence of these is a severe drawback to happiness.

Because of this dependence, some identify happiness •.::.:-.:.

with good f'Ortune.

We see that Aristotle was speaking largely to the

e 1 ite of society or those who were in a poe it ion to become statesmen.
We - must not take the relationship between external influence and :,happiness as the forn:er being the only requirement for the latter, however.
The greatest good cannot oorre from chance as can external goods and prosperity.

It must, therefore, come by study and care.

praiseworthy, but happiness is above praise.
tionehip, that of happiness and virtue.

Also, virtue is

Here we have another r .e la-

Happiness co:tres from eonsietent

engagement in virtuous activit iee.
Happiness ie the end of human nature.

In other words, act ion in

accordance with the rational principle or the following of virtue,
which ie a product of the rational principle, ia happineee or the key to
happiness.

It is neither a diepoaition, nor does it lack anything.

9sa};)akian, op. cit., p. 4.
lO Ibid. , p. 6.

.,
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Although prosperity and good health are very important to ac.hieving
happiness, it can be achieved, nevertheless, without them.

It does not

lie in amusement, for arnuse·nent and re laxa.t ion are not ends but are taken
for the sake of activities.

The gods experience complete happiness be-

cause their life is principally contemplative, happiness lying in
reasoned virtue.

Since animals cannot .contemplate, they cannot experi-

ence happiness.

Philosophers are closest to the gods because of their

contemplative activities, and they are, therefore, happiest.

A paradox

ar iaes when we learn that happiness, the ultimate good, cannot be obtained
by pursuing it as does the hedonist.
The

deriva~ions

Rather, the hedonist pursues pleasure.

of the two words are different, pleasure coming from

the Greed word, hedone, meaning

11

sensual ata~e 11 , and happineas coming

from the Greek work, eudaimonia, meaning

11

beautiful state of mind 11 .ll

At first glance, it would seem that happiness is obviously good,
but a one philosophers do scorn it.

The 1 ife of enjoyment has inherent

advantages including those of the intrinsic value of
application, and the contemplative life.l 2

en~oyrrent,

political

The first advantage applies

to those who are vulgar or young and seek happiness as does the hedonist.
The second applies to those who channel their pursuit of enjoynent into
political areas and seek the honor which is usually the end of political
life.

The third adv ·ntage pertains to those who, in accordance with the

teach-ings of Aristotle, pursue happineas in the form of the virtuous and
contemplative life.
Al we have said, happiness comes from virtuous living in accordance
with a rational principle.

In fact, happiness is a continuum as long as

there is engagement in virtuous activities.
nition of virtue as a way of life

-I

llibid., p. 8.
12 rbid.

l

~ nd

This leads us to the recog-

not just doing the right thing in

6
one circumstance.
acta.

Virtue is. acquired by repitition of the corresponding

The act ions that produce moral virtue, however, are not good in

the earre sense as those which flm1 from virtue.
does not necessarily make a man virtuous.

Doing virtuous acts

This brings up the division

of virtues into those whic'h are intellectual and those which are moral.
The former applies to philosophical wisdom, practical wisdom, and understanding, and comes largely from instruction.

The latter applies to

such things as 1 iberality. and temperance, and is obt a ined by habit.
Moral virute is state of character which comes from a freedom to choose
th~

right course and the percept ion to do so.

faculty.

It is not a pass ion or a

Since happiness stems from virtuous living and vice versa,

virtue is concerned with pleasure and pain.
But what is the yardstick for virtuous acts?

Ar is tot le holds that

it is acting in accordance with a mean, or avoiding excess or defect.
This mean is hard to define exactly in reference to certain virtues, so
acting in accordance with the nean requires perception rather than
reasoning, ao.oor.d _ing to Aristotle.

In oases where the zrean is extremely

difficult to discern, the lesser of two evils ma.y

ne~d

The mean of which we apeak i.e oft.en r'eferred to .a s the

to be chosen.
11

Golden l'.ean 11

,

an expression Aristotle did not use himself.
Now this mean refers to the Right Act, or that act which is in accordanoe with nature or the rationa.rl prinoi.p le.

Kant's concept of the Right

Act is the categorical imperative, and Bentham has his hedonistic calculua, while Aristotle has the

11

Golden ~an 11 •

The Right Act is

11

to

do the right thing t o the right person, to the right extent, at the right
tine, with the right motive, and in the right way.nl3

As involved as

this is, we colD!! back to the concept that ethical superiority and moral
excellence neoeas itate innate discernment and learning of the highest

13 Ibid., p. 13.

-

'
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magnitude.

In other words, the Ethics is directed at students who are

pr!sumed to have enough general education to appreciate the points and
have a solid foundation of good habits.

In sumnary, virtue is the result

of habitual action in accordance with the rational principle and is the
thing which leads to happiness.
It is important to point out. that the individual has a. free will or
choice, which makes him morally responsible for what he does.
ponsible for hie good actions as well as his bad actions.

He ie res-

In moral vir-

tue, the object of choice is the result of previous deliberation.

Moral

virtue is not concerned with things which are outs ide our own power.

vie cannot really deliberate about things we cannot control.

Consequently,

praise and blame are concerned with voluntary actions and not those
actions which are done under compuision or out of ignorance.
Now the mean ca,n be spoken of as the

Right ~

Act, which, when habitually

practiced, becomes virtue and is concerned with virtuous actions.

On

the other hand, deficiency and excess can be spoken of aa the immoral
act, which, when habitually practiced, becomes vice· and ·is concerned with
vicious ac t ions.

Herewith will follow a. discussion of certain of Aris-

totle's means and accompanying extremes.
Courage is concerned with the feelings .of fear and confidence.

The

motive of it is the sense of honor, and the opposite vices are cowardice
and rashness, or foolhardiness.

There are five things which are often

improperly called coura.ge--(1) the courage of the citizen soldier, according t -o compulsion (2·) experience with regard to the con~lict, or
professional coolness (5) passion, or action from strength of feeling

(4) overconfidence bacause - of success, and (5) ignorance of danger.
Courage is involved with pain, but the pleasure which corres with the virtue is resultant.

Courage could be spoken of as rac i ng and fearing the

8
the right thing : , for the right motive, inthe right way, at the right
titte, and feeling confidence under the corresponding conditions.l4
Temperance is the rre a n between insenadbil ity and 1 icentiousne sa.
Whe n considering this virute, we should understand the world, sensual
and sensuous.

The first is base and refers to appetites and desires.

The second de a ls more with appreciation of music and art.

At any rate,

bodily pleasures lead us to self-indulgence and to the extree in which we
become like animals.

The self-indulgent man is pained when he is not ex ;- ,

periencing pleasure, while the temperate man is not.
the rational principle, which Aristotle refers to as
chastened state 11 •

Temperance reflects
11

an obedient and

The temperate man craves for the ' things he ought,

when he ought, as he ought.
Liberality is the lt'ean in regard to wealth.
extrettes of illiberality and prodigality.

It lies between the "-;· _ _

The nark of a li\)eral man is

to give to the right people, the right amounts, at the right time, with
all the other qualifications that accompany right giving, and
with pleasure or without pain.

,~hat

too

He who gives with pain is not lib.e ral be-

cause it is the nature of the 1 iberal a nd virtuous man not to loo'k to
himself.

~anesa

or illiberality is much more plentiful than prodigality

and cannot cure itself as does prodiga lity.

The inclusion of liberality

as a virtue brings us a gain to the point that Aristotle wrote the Ethics
primarily for a privileged group.
to a man's substance.

He does say that liberality is relative

Finally, the liberal are almost the best loved of

all virtuous characters since they are

us~ful.

Magnificence goes a step beyond liberality a nd has to do with the
spending of large sums of money tastefully.
14 lbi d • , P• 20.

It is the nean between

9
vulgarity or showiness and niggardl ineas or hea ita.tion.

This virtue,

of course, applies only to the ric:h.
Magnanimity 1 ies between. the extreme a , hurail tty >:1nd vanity.

It is a

high self-res pect, which makes a person self-euffic ient but not conceited
or vain.

It deals with pride, which Aristotle says is a mark of a good

He even goes so far as to s ay that the greatest external good is

man.
honor.

Magnanimous rrenaak for little but give help readily.

Aristotle

gets quite ca.ught up in his description of a magnanimous nan and pictures
him as one who admires nothing very much, is open in hate and love, is
not mindful of wrongs, haa a slow step, deep voice, and level utterance,
and admires beaut·if'ul rather than profitable things.

'r he na.gnanimous man

is Aristotle's ideal.
The extrerrea, lack of ambition and ambitiousness, have no name for
their nean.

This problem arises chiefly from the fact that ambit ion can ·

be both good and bad.
other times, censored.

Sonet in"es the ambitious man is praised and, at
The s ame applies to def.i ciency.

Gentleness l iea between unirasc ibility and irascibility.
is another name for this n:ean or virtue.
other is a sort of indifference.
two states.

Good temper

One extreme is anger, and the

It is hard to draw the line between the

The mean involves being angry at the right things.

Truthfulness lies between boastfulness and self-depreciation or understateroont.

The truthful man tends to understate the truth, howe-v er.

Both extremes are actually a form of boasting when we consider the effect
that self-depreciation can have ·.
11

fishing for a complixrent 11 •

The situation can be sorrething akin to

A. truthful man is truthful even when then is

nothing to lose or gain, just for truth's sake.
Wli:.ttiness is the possession of a tactful, whoeson.:e sense of humor.
The extremes of excess and defect are buffoonery and boorishness.

This

virtue is connected with intelligence since this mean requires a man to

10
be ready-witted.

Along with the virtue of wit comes tact, or the sense

of what to say at what titre, and vice

versa~

Friendliness lies between contentiousness and obsequiousness or
flattery.

An obse quious person can be likened to a

11

Yes Ma n 11

A man

•

corresponding to the middle state could be called a good friend.

Now there

are three types of friends, detlerrnined by the motives for friendship.
First, there are friends for utility, such as business friends.

Secondly,

there are friendships based upon pleasure, and these are hedonistic.
Thirdly, there is a good and pure kind of friendship.

The first two are

esaent ially selfish motives, while the last pertains to the rrean.
This pure friendship, is baaed upon an equality.
is the friendship of

n~n

Perfect friendship

who are good and alike in virtue, and who, there-

fore, are on e qual terms.

Along with this likeness comes a mutua l rec og-

nit ion as bear i ng goodwill.

Friendship is gre atly pro rr oted by common

upbringing and a imilar ity of age.

Virtue is import a nt bec a use bad men

are laden with repentance, and if a man cannot st a nd himself, he c a nnot
be friendly.

If we are wretched, we should work to av oid wicked ness and

endeavor to be good.

This is the only wa y tha t . we can be friendly.

Sour

I

or old people do not make friends easily.

Neither do young people because

their relationships tend to be more emotiona l or amorous.

!nequality can

exist in friends-hip, as in the case of friendship between a f ather and son.
Other types of friendship ard.se from the - relationships among siblings,
strange11~ 3

schoolfellows, and the 1 ike.

There is a certain amount of wish for gain in friendship.
ambit ion, we wie h to be loved rather than to love.
estimation, is akin to honor.
espectally strong in unequale.

Owing to

Being loved, in our

This desire for benefits in friendship is
In an unequal friendship, love is propor-

tional, the better party bei.ng the best loved.

The benefactor receives

11
more than the reoeive.r of love because of

th~

resulting debt of gratitude.

This gives rise to a certain amount of selfishness in friendship.

People

love more, that which is a product of their own labor, hence, the greater
love of a woman toward her children than the man.
not bad in the case of vittuoue people.

This selfishness is

In other words, by nature of

his attitudes and relative goals and acts, a good man should be a lover
of self, while a wicked man should not.
Goodwill is not like friendship.
strangers.

A person can have goodwill toward

It does, however, seem to be the beg inning for friendship and

is an inactive fr iendehip which a.r ises on account of some exce lle nee or ·
worth.

Another type of relationship whicb resembles friendship is unan-

imity.

'rhis is a friendly relationship born of a common goal rather than

identity of opd:nion.
Unanimity is related to the point that friendship is very important,
even necessary, in government.

The feeling of working toward a common

advantage is necessary in communities.
irrevocably related to politics.
be-st atmosphere for friendship.

Of courae,utility friendship is

Aristotle holds that a de mocracy is the
An oligarchy results in a poor distri-

bution of what belongs to the city, and tyranny is characterized by an
individual 1 s pursuit of his own g ood.

These three types of government

are deviations from the three constitutions--tyranny from· monarchy, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy from timocra.cy.
least harmful of the deviat. ion.

De mocracy is the

Just ice and friendship char a cterize

constitutions while injustice and lack of fr iendehip characterize deviations.

In democracy, however, friendship exists because of equality.

Parallels of the constitutions may be found in households.
The happy man should have the great e st of all external goods, friends.
Since ma n is a political cre ature and . one whose nature is to 1 ive with

12
others, a. happy man needs friends.

Since life seems to be essentially

the acts of perceiving or thinking, a happy man will need just not any

kind of friends, but virtuous friends.
or a hindrance to the noble 1 ife.

T oo many friends are superflous

Love is an excess of fr iendahip which

can be felt toward only one person.

Since good and virtuous friends are

limited, we must be content with even a few in a lifetime.

Friendship is

more necessary in bad fortune, but is more noble in good fortune.
either case, the presence of friends is desirable.

In

'r r,e values of a group

0£ friends determine what they do together, hence noble deeds come from

noble men.

If a friend is irrevocably changed for the pad, it is all

right to end the friendship • . If, however, it is not d rrevocable, you
should try to help hiro.
In conclusion, friendship is the most desirable of external goods
and 1 ies between the extrerres, content iouanesa and obsequiousness.

It

is a state of character based upon equality and thrives more readily in
the presence of two

aimilar

and virtuous rren.

It is unlike friendship

for utility or pleasure bec a use it is self-dependent, while they are
tr s.nsient.

It is concerned with politics, snd it more readily lives in

a democracy because of equality.

·r o possess the character of friendship,

one must be a good friend.
Modesty lies between the e xtrerres, sharreleesnesa and bashfulness •
. This virtue deals with fee 1 ings and sta t es of mind.
adults, but is permissable in youth.

Shaire is not good in

In fact, it is praised in youth.

Shame is fear of dis honor and is connected with bad act ions.
Justice is the summary of all v1irtue.
who is pretending virtue.

It will find out the person

Justice is of two types, f a irness and lawful-

ness, which is divided into d iatr ibut ion of wealt h and dealing with
criminals.

The forrrer, fairness, is particular, while the latter is

univers a l.

Justice is the virtue with regards to our acttion toward others

and' probably the highest since it concerns the others.

The just has

to do with a proportion that is geometrical, which, when violated, is
unjust.

In other words, by acting unjustly, one term of the proportion

becomes too great, and the balance of just ice is upset.

Reef:. if'icatory

justice is concerned with the addition and subtraction of gain or loss,
or the restoration of the proportion.

Justice lies between the excess

and defect of unjust action and be i ng treated unjustly.

In other words,

the proportion deals with the amount of harm or advantage received.
You can act unjustly but not be unjust.
acts do not make a. man just.
the acta are voluntary.

The terms, just and unjust, apply only when

In other words, there are things that are unjust

but that are not acts of injustice.
it is a mistake.

When an act is done out of ignorance,

When something happens contrary to reasonable expectation,

it is a misadventure.

act of injustice.

By the same token, j uat

When something is done with deliberation, it is an

Such planned injustic.e makes a man unjust.

unjustly treated, of course, is usually involuntary.
treat themselves unjustly, however.

Being

Modest people

A man like this largely makes up for

it by receiving honor and hobility accordingly.

Suicide is not unjust to a man since it is voluntary.
suffered by the state.

The injustice is

Suicide is fairly unique in that the man does

the harm and· suffers it at the sane time.
ment of just ice is a complex process.

The determination and enforce-

For instance, a man, more or leas,

owns hi! household, so there is a difference between
cal joetice and equality.

househbl~ d

and politi-

In conc lusion, justice ia the middle term

in an equal proportion, which, when upset, results in injustice.
can only be called just or- unjust when they are done voluntarily.

'fhings
Justice

has been called the highest virtue because of its relationship with the
other virtues.
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Pleasure is the most closely related to human nature of all experiences.

Some philosopher• say it is good while othere say it is not.

The opposition between pain and pleasure is the avoidance of one and
pursuit of the other.
people.

Pleasure is in degrees and differs with different

It is not the ultimate good, and not all pleasure is deaira:bte. •. . .

Disgracrful pleas urea are not really pleasant.
are good.
best.

Sone pleaeures, however,

Pleasure is present when both object and race iver are at their

It accompanies activity, and since there can be no continuous

activity, pleasure has to atop sone.t ime.
The
Th~

stt~dy

of pleasure and pain belongs to the political philosopher.

main or it ic isms of pleasure are that it is a proceaa toward an animal

state, the temperate man avoids it, the practical man pursues freedom
from pain rather than pleasure, it is a hindrance to thought, there is
no art to it while goodness is a product of art, children and brutes
pursue it, and so_ne pleasures are base and . harmful.

On the other hand,

some pleasures are not bad, such as those involved in learning.
pleasure is better than pain.

In the final analysis, pleasure can be good,

but it is not the good at which all things
a person.

Besides

ai~,

'

and it can actually dull

In one . man •-a .interpretation, pleasure is not the primary con-

stituent of well being, but rather an inaeperable accident of it.l5
The good is arrived at by thought, fixed by intent ion,. aimed at by
will, under the influence of practical wiadom.
discussion of wisdom.

16

This brings us to the

The soul ·' has the two types of virtues, those of

character and those of intellect.

The two .P.a rts of the souJ ·:, are the one

that gu.sps the rational principle and the one that grasps the irrational.
15Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, (Boston& Beacon
Press, 19)1), p. 54.
l6rbid., p. 141.
.

:: ,
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Of the part that grasps the rational principle are the part that grasps

the invariable and the part that grasps the variable.

The invariable

can be grasped by calculation, while the variable must be grasped by
deliberation and contemplation.

The three things that control action

and truth in the soul are sensation, reason, and des ire.
nates no action.

Sensation or igi-

Good choice results from a coupling of true reasoning

and deliberate desire.

Intellect plus character produces action.

Thus, de 1 iberat ion is concerned with the future.
The soul possesses truth by way of affirma.t.ion or denial of art,
acientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and intuitive
reason.

Scientific knowledge is eternal and necessary, and all of it .i s

capable of being taught.

In science, there is the inductive, whicrJ leads

to universals, and the deductive, which proceeds from the inductive.
Now, art is concerned with things made, while reason or wisdom is largely
concerned with things done.
rrot particulars.

Practical wisdom deale with generalities,

It ia not scientific because there is no contemplation

about necessities, and it is not art because it concerns doing rather
than making.

It can be defined as the true and reasoned state or capacity

to act with regard to the things that are good or bad to man.
virtue.

It is a

Along with art, it concerns variables, while eo ient ific knowledge

concerns universal truths.

Scientific knowledge i.e different in that it

results from intuitive reason rather th!i-n practical wisdom.
Philosophic wiadom is a coupling of intuitive reason and sc-ientific
knowledge and concerns practical wisdon; when act :i.on is lnvol ved.

Ar is-

tot le said that priloaopbic wisdom was remarkable, admirable, difficult,
divine, and useless because it did not seek human goods.

He said that

one should have both philosophic and practical wisdom, but that the
latte.r should be preferred to the former.

16
Pract'ical wisdom

nd political wisdom are of the same state .of mind

but different essence.

The forrrer deals with generalities while the latter

deals with particulars.

s

found, because he lac

A young man of practical wisdom is not to be
experience and knowledge. of particulars.

boy can be a mathe\ina.t cian but not a philosopher.

Deliberation or

inquiry into particul re does not concern scientific
there is no inquiry iJ:to known things i

A

knowle~ge

because

they are already known.

-.·

They

do not concern conjec lure bec~~ee there is no reasoning in guessing,
THey do not cone ern readiness of mind because this is

and it lis hurried.

just skill in conject Ire.

They are not opinion.

Deliberation is correct-

ness of thinking, not for evil ends, not by wrong means(false syllogism),
and not if it takes t f o long.
Understanding ie Jot concerned with invariable a, is close to practical
wisdom, and deals wit
ie understanding.

judging.

Learning plus practic r1.l application

Oor:rect judgment is synipathet ic and strives to

dis cern what is true.

< ..::

The cumulation of these qua lities is thought to

be largely the result of na:tural endowments.
Philosophic wisdq ·:

p.ro.duc~s

happiness because the person is a part

... ,...

of the total virtue'. : : V:i ,rtue concerns actions.
deals with f a culty ahd ; ·c leverness.

imp~aaitile

making it

+

How to do these things

Wickedness perverta and deceives u.s ,

be practically wise without being good.

Now, for philosopHic wisdom to be usef.ul at all, a person must not
be .incontinent,
reason.

In o1 hor words, he nust act in accordance with hio

Practical wisdom is the strongest of all states and most opposed

to incontinence.
because temperance

Oo1 inence is regard to appetite is not temperance
li~ens

Oontinence is bad whe
is virtue.

I

one to a person who has a bad appetite.

it is dognatic.

Folly coupled with incontinence

Act.ing by the continence of others is fallacious.

Oont inence

17
is concerned with specific objects.
which lead to incontinence.
they have no judgrrent.

Anger and passion are two things

Lower animals are not continent because

Aristotle asks the question of whether there is an

incontinent person without qualification and whether all men are inc ont inent in some things.
It is pointed out that we regard bodily pleasure to excess as a fault
while money, gain, and honor to excess are not a fault.

This leads us to

the dis cuss ion of self-indulgence, with which cont ine nee and incontinence
deal.

Self-indulgence is a habit, is contrary to nature, and can be

injurious to the syatem • . A self-indulgent man is not apt to change
while incontinence, in itself, is more flexible.
B.:rutiahnees and morbidity are extensions of incontinence.
ia better than gluttony bec a use it is more natural.
result of plotting.

Pain accompanies anger.

Anger is

Now anger
~ot

the

A bad man is much worse than

an angry man or a brute.
Incontinence is not a vice.
an incontinent man.

The fi.rst principle is preserved within .

Rather it is intermittent badneii_e.

Incant inence

can come both through adhering to the wrong and ignoring the right.
Continence comes by abiding by the right choice.
tical wisdom and be incontinent.

A man connot have prac-

An incontinent man may either ignore

his deliberation or just not take the time and trouble to deliberate.
Most men lie between lives of extreme continence and extreme incontinence.
This completes the discussion of the content of the Ethics.

As was

eaid before, the Ethics cornpr ises the first part of a general treat iae,
the second part being Politics.

The Ethics was written especially to

train atatearren who could then apply the teachings to helping form a
society in which other

~n

could achieve happiness.

needs to be instilled in the youth.
accordingly.

The love of virtue

l ,aws should direct and punish

The punishment should fit the cri.rne.

Along with the

18
teachings of philosophers like himself, Aristotle holds that the family
and private education do much to shape the young per·aon.

\'lith the intra-

duct ion to Pol it ice, Aristotle concludes the Nicoma.chean Ethics.
The Ethics of Aristotle have had an effect on later philosophers.
Hie philosophy lends itself to modification for religious purpoaee.
In Thomas Acquinas' Summa. contra Gent ilea, he goes along with Aristotle
in stressing the importance of self-realization and the possession of will.
He goes on to agree with Aristotle that there is a summum bonum in the
form of happiness.

Acquinas held that ultimate happiness caue · through

contemplation of God.

He alio recognized the importance of nature and

natural law and described it as resulting from God 1 s will.

Acquinas

outlined virtues with his S'e ven Carq inal Virtues, temperance, f ·ort itude,
wisdom, justice, faith, hope, and charity.

The last three are taken from

the Bible, but the first four resemble Aristotle's virtues.
To go on concerning Acguinas, he said,
every appetite. 11

11

The good is the object of

Therefore, all action is for good, and evil is

incidental, ace idental, or unitent ional.
and there is ··no supreue evil.

Evil is not neeeasary to nature,

There is one auprene good, which is

~od.

All things tend toward God, and the supreme effort or object of . Man's
knowledge ·is to know God.

~an is adapted by nature to tend to God, and

the last end is to understand God.
life.

This is the end of the intellectual

Anima ls have neither intellect nor joy.

Carnal pleasure does

not bri.ng happiness since ultimate happineu utilizes intelligence.
Alii can be seen, Acquinas took the Ethics of Aristotle and applied
them to Christianity.

This thirteenth century philosopher determined,

by hia writings, for a long time, the moral philosophy of the Roman
Oatholic Church.l7This work was initiated by Albert the Great and completed
l7 Ibid., p. 140.
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by St. Thomas Acquinal.

Aristotle's philosophy was a little Neo-

Platonic, and Acquinas drew heavily from Augustine for his Christian
doctrine.l8

The Jesuits closely followed the writings of.Acquinas.

Aristotle 1 a concept of personal good achieved through part ic ipat ion
in civilization profoundly influenced the so-called Neo-Hegel ian idealist,
'r homas Hill Green, who e:aid that ·11 the self is the social self. 11 19
Also, the

lw\l~Hm

the Ethics.

ethical work, Ibn ll.a.skawaihi, . is largely patterned after

The British people as a whole are rather firmly entrenched

in Ar istote 1 ian ism. 2 0

In conclusion, the Nicomachean

Eth~ca

stressed happiness as the

ultimate good, which was achieved by acting in accordance with reason
and nature and by living according to a

11

Golden M:lan 11

•

It was written

pril!'arily to train statesnen and leads into a discussion of politics.
It haa had far-reaching . e-ffect, including that of largely forming the
bas is of the ethical s:ystem· of the Roman Catholic Church, when coupled
with the teachings of Christ·:
One source hold,f! that

11

there is probably~ n~.. trea.tise so masterly

as Aristotle's Ethica, and containing so much close and valid thought,
that yet leaves on the reader's mind so s-trong an impression of diaperaive
and incomplete work. 2 1

. Lot .ia, however, easily grasped and mastered,

thereby capable of having a widespread following, readily practicable,
provides an easy-to-follow, middle-of .. the~road philosophy, and ~~· easily
18Ibid., p. 141.
19vergil ius Ferm, Encyclopedia of Ma.rala, (New Y"~~: Philosop-hical
Library, 1956), p. 191.

20sah!\{ ian, op. cit., p. 11.
2 1Sidgwick, op. cit., P. 70.

20
adaptible to religion, as in the cases of Acquina.e for Christianity
and Aver roes for the Arabs .22
Furthermore, the Ethics is an analytical reflection upon the common
moral conec iousnesa of the day, there by having hiator ical interest.

It

gives us an idea of the nra ir and good 1 ife 11 , which was the ideal for
the Greeks. 2 ;

This concludes our discussion of the Nicomachean_Ethics.

22Sahak ian, op. cit. , pp. )9-40.
2 ;Sidgwick, Ci>p. cit., p.

58.
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